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A Walk Through Chengdu

                                      

A Walk Through Chengdu

by Craig Simons

Take a walk through any Chinese city and you’ll see that China is changing fast.

A few months ago, I walked through Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. I started near the bend in the Funan River where thousands of migrant workers gather each day and wait, hoping for jobs. They line the sidewalks, leaning on rough denim bags that hold everything they’ve brought with them from their distant homes. They are part of China’s floating population; across China there are more than 150 million like them.(1) Mostly they are peasants hoping to make better lives than what they could expect in the countryside. But they come without hukous, city residence permits, and so are stuck with the worst jobs at the worst pay and they live in some of the worst conditions that I have ever seen.

A few miles north of where the migrants wait is one of the hippest parts of Chengdu, an area full of five-star hotels, trendy shops and first-class restaurants. China’s "little princes," the new wealthy, stay, eat and play there, and between the two parts of the city one sees the clash of China’s "socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics" (increasingly code for plain old capitalism) and its socialist propaganda and past. Many of the unemployed waiting beside the Funan River have not forgotten that in Mao’s China they were meant to be masters, and in the 1990s, Chinese worker unrest grew as job security decreased and wages didn’t meet expectations. And they had only to look down the street to see China’s new elite eating in glitzy restaurants.

Chinese worker unrest is likely to continue to grow after China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO) since Chinese goods will have to compete with foreign products and many Chinese firms will fail. Even Chinese agriculture, mostly privatized since Deng’s economic reforms began in 1978, will have trouble. It is expected that when American sugar and wheat alone begin to flood Chinese markets, ten million Chinese peasants will lose their jobs.(2)

Down a side street I stop at an Internet bar full of students surfing the web, e-chatting with friends in other cities and countries and soaking in new ideas. Unlike hundreds of generations before them, they are not growing up in a closed China. They e-mail with friends in Shanghai and New York and increasingly they do not share their parents’ values. As they type, they create an intricate network and one can bet that if there is another mass student movement as there was in 1989, the Internet will play a large part. The Internet bar is another sign that as China opens its markets everything is changing.

Across the Pacific, in the United States, the debate about China mostly revolves around two characterizations: one an antagonistic China likely to threaten U.S. interests and security, the other an opening China friendly to U.S. interests. Often it overlooks a third possibility: China could become a center of instability in Asia and the world.

I saw that walking through Chengdu. There are tensions pulling at China from the bottom (think of the migrants) and the top (think of the Internet bar), and if Beijing can’t keep control as it presses through economic reforms likely to see such massive transitions as the migration of 400 million peasants to the cities,(3) grave environmental problems, and rising un- and underemployment, China could become unstable.

A Chinese melt-down would result in a number of things harmful to the United States: international crime would rise as China became a free zone for crime syndicates, illegal migration would increase, a security vacuum would open in Asia, and environmental degradation would worsen and spill into neighboring countries.

The Chinese interests in stable economic reforms are more obvious. Stable reforms will improve Chinese lives (even though there will be a period when some Chinese will suffer because of them), promote improved Chinese relations with other countries and, from the Party’s perspective, likely keep the current leaders in power for at least a while longer (whereas freezing or slowing reforms might create immediate political unrest).

On both sides of the Pacific, from common folk to top leaders, stable Chinese reforms are probably more attractive than the status quo and certainly more attractive than the possible chaos if Beijing loses control. The United States and China can take steps to influence the chance of successful and stable reforms. The United States should do a number of things:

Work to help China make a smoother transition toward a full market economy. This might involve giving China subsidized loans or creating incentives for U.S. firms investing in China. It might be remembered that the United States pumped great sums of money into Taiwan in the 1950s and 60s to show that capitalism works. Now would be a good time to demonstrate the same lesson in Mainland China.
Temper its moral indignation as China reforms and move toward a more objective perception of China. Especially since 1989, U.S. citizens have been generally critical of the Chinese government. U.S. politicians, realizing this and motivated by personal convictions, have pushed for changes in Chinese governance by punishing China for "bad" behavior and by offering "carrots" to be "good." If U.S. politicians punish China by cutting American aid and investment or prod China by linking aid and investments to conditions that Beijing is unlikely to accept, it may weaken the chances for successful Chinese reforms.
To move the United States toward a friendlier perception of China, American policy-makers and the president should work steadily to explain to politicians and the public why it is in the U.S. interest to support stable Chinese reforms. The administration might also stress the political and social opening that has happened in China (such as village elections and increasing social and economic opportunities) and argue that reforms will allow China to build a legal and political system capable of running a more democratic country. The administration’s message to Americans, assuming that China continues to reform, should be that China is changing and the emerging system better reflects American values.

Work to get China into multinational and multilateral organizations. Chinese involvement in such organizations is likely to keep it on track with reforms and will increase international trust in Chinese stability.
Facilitate more effective Chinese management of Chinese affairs. The United States should support the training of Chinese managers and leaders. It should also revise U.S. laws that restrict American assistance to China in such areas as environmental protection and development of the rule of law.
Keep communication with China open at all levels. Efforts should be made to promote more exchange visits of Chinese and American leaders and policymakers. Communication should produce a dialogue, not a series of lectures, between the countries.
Support peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue (or at least maintain the status quo). Inflaming the Taiwan issue would damage Sino-U.S. relations and make it harder for American politicians to aid Chinese reforms. It would slow the Chinese economy and heighten instability.
No one knows better than Beijing the precarious position it is in as it tries to hold onto power and transform the country’s economy while the reforms create tensions within society and the Party. For stable reforms, China should do a number of things:

Continue to steadily marketize the economy. China should honor the market-opening commitments it made as part of the WTO accession process. Although this will cause short-term unrest, it also will increase international confidence in Beijing’s commitment to reform.
Argue more clearly that while the reform period will be difficult, it will slowly improve the quality of Chinese life for all Chinese. Beijing also should try to alleviate present suffering by improving the welfare system and providing loans to encourage small private businesses. Both steps will moderate instability.
Systematically ferret out government corruption. Anti-corruption efforts will help to convince the public that officials are not profiting from their suffering, an action that will moderate instability.
Avoid pushing the Taiwan issue. Inciting nationalism to direct attention away from the government during the difficult reform period will be attractive, but Beijing should be aware that attacks on Taiwan (whether rhetorical or physical) would turn world opinion against it, slowing economic reform and increasing instability.
Keep communication with the United States open at all levels. Beijing should strive to maintain a meaningful dialogue with U.S. leaders and elites through visits and exchanges.
The United States and China share an interest in stable Chinese economic reforms and both governments should realize how tentative stability is. Maybe our leaders should take a walk through Chengdu.

 Notes

1. Richard Behar, "Beijing’s Phony War on Fakes," Fortune, November 6, 2000, p. 191..

2. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Five Myths," The New York Times, October 27, 2000.

3. Ken Lieberthal, talk at Harvard University entitled "The Clinton Administration Policy in Asia," November 7, 2000.

 

Craig Simons graduated from the University of Pennsylvania with a B.A. in English in 1995. He taught English in Sichuan province as a Peace Corps volunteer from 1996 to 1998, worked at the Kennedy School of Government in 1999 and did freelance writing assignments from Sichuan in 2000. After completing a Master’s degree in East Asian Studies from Harvard University in May 2001, he hopes to work as a journalist in Asia.

【作者: Journalist】【访问统计:】【2005年05月17日 星期二 22:16】【注册】【打印】